State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action
In recent years, the Supreme Court has become increasingly reluctant to imply private rights of action under federal statutes not explicitly providing such a remedy.' The pressure on courts from injured persons seeking a cause of action remains,' however, and as the federal forum becomes less hospitable to private parties, plaintiffs may look increasingly to state courts for vindication of their rights. State court remedies are not necessarily foreclosed by the denial of an implied federal right of action. The demise of implied federal rights of action reflects an acknowledgment of the federal courts' limited power to create judicial remedies for statutory wrongs. The remedial powers of the states, however, are much broader than those of the federal courts; thus even when implied federal rights of action have been denied, states may often be able to provide a right of action to private plaintiffs by creating a parallel state law that incorporates federal law by reference. 3 Given the current hostility of the Supreme Court to the implication of federal rights of action, state incorporation of federal standards in a state law right of action presents itself as an appropriate step forward in the vindication of individuals' statutory rights, a step in keeping with the best traditions of a federal system.
I. THE DEMISE OF THE IMPLIED FEDERAL RIGHTS OF ACTION
The recent reversal in the Supreme Court's approach to the judicial creation of private rights of action under federal statutes not expressly providing such a remedy 4 manifests an increasing hostility to implied federal rights of action. 5 The Court's newly emergent implication doctrine focuses tightly on legislative intent:' Implication requires a finding of explicit or implicit congressional intent to create a private right of action.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1144, 1985 Since the issue of whether Congress intended to create a right of action for private plaintiffs arises only when Congress has not expressly authorized such a remedy, the Court, in effect, attempts to divine legislative intent from congressional silence.' Under the Court's present analysis, congressional silence, itself inherently ambiguous, 9 has been construed as an intentional denial of private rights of action. 0 The Supreme Court's intent analysis reflects a recognition of the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts, as well as broader separation-ofpowers concerns:" "[F]ederal courts, unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers. . . . [T]he federal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government ... ."I' Implying a action, either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction."); accord Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94 ("[Ulnless this congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.").
8. This method of analysis has met with serious academic criticism. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 194 (2d ed. Supp. 1981) (noting that Court's current analysis may create danger of "game playing").
9. The Supreme Court itself noted the difficulty of discerning legislative intent from Congressional silence: "[Liegislative silence is often encountered in implied-right-of-action cases; it is to be expected that 'the legislative history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question.'" Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694). See also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3235 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Congress, for reasons of its own, all too frequently elects to remain silent on the private right-of-action question. The result frequently is uncertainty and litigation as to available remedies, leaving the courts to provide an answer without clear legislative guidance."); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 285, 290-91 (1963) (discussing ambiguity of legislative silence and dubiousness of negative implication).
10.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court gave notice to Congress that " [w] hen Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much when it creates those rights." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717. In keeping with this policy, the Court has interpreted congressional silence as prohibitory, establishing a clear presumption that when Congress has not explicitly authorized a right of action, Congress did not intend to create one. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 572 ("Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly."); Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94 ("It is, of course, not within our competence as federal judges to amend these comprehensive enforcement schemes by adding to them another private remedy not authorized by Congress."); cf. id. at 97 (noting that "[tihe presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme") (emphasis added). private right of action arguably constitutes a judicial appropriation of congressional authority. 1 3 Further, the creation of private enforcement mechanisms may impinge upon the development of substantive regulatory policy-a function reserved to the legislative and executive branches. 14 In essence, the Court is concerned that an unwarranted exercise of judicial remedial power may provide private plaintiffs with a cause of action Congress never intended to create.
These objections to the creation of implied rights of action by the federal courts do not, however, preclude the creation of state remedies. Insofar as current implication doctrine is based upon the limited remedial powers of the federal judiciary, the Court's rationale is inapplicable to the creation of private remedies by state common law courts of general jurisdiction. With respect to state lawmaking, congressional silence should be construed as permissive rather than prohibitory. The power of state courts to create rights of action and remedies is limited only by the possibility of federal preemption; 15 preemption aside, there are no independent separation-of-powers or federalism concerns that would justify further restriction of the states' traditional remedial powers. Therefore, despite the foreclosure of federal implied rights of action under the Supreme Court's narrow congressional intent analysis, there are permissible and appropriate avenues of state action, including state incorporation of federal law. If plaintiffs cannot find a remedy under federal law, they may now resort to state law to obtain the relief they seek. 6 The Texas law has been carefully designed to comply with federal law and to ensure commitment to the federal standards. While the state's model of enforcement was designed with reference to the federal law, Texas has extended the implications of the federal law by providing redress for the individual. The remedy which Gatlin relies upon is state created. The Texas legislature, rather than the United States Congress, has been sympathetic to enforcement of these federal duties for the benefit of the individual purchaser. The area of individual relief is not occupied by the federal law in a preemptive sense; nor is it served through the implication of a private cause of action under the federal law. The question of whether or not a common-law right of action exists for the violation of a federal statute is a matter of state law. We are not able to find a state cause of action in this instance. The separation-of-powers doctrine and principles of federalism militate against the adoption of the federal statute as the standard of care in a state negligence action when no private cause of action, either explicit or implicit, exists in the federal statute.
13.
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The court cites in support of its reasoning Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago. Id. at 290 n.23 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-31). The court cites the dissent for the vague and seemingly inapposite proposition that "Justice Powell stated that the majority's opinion illustrates how the implication of a private right of action 'denigrates the democratic process."' Id. In fact, Justice Powell's separation-of-powers concerns are ultimately related to what he believes to be an unwarranted expansion of the federal courts' limited jurisdiction: "When Congress chooses not to provide a private civil remedy,federal courts should not assume the legislative role of creating such a remedy and thereby enlarge their jurisdiction." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-31 (emphasis added). Thus, Justice Powell concludes that in implying private rights of action, "the Court has tended to stray from the Art. III and separation-of-powers principle of limited jurisdiction." Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
31. Hofbauer, 700 F.2d at 1201. 32. After finding that there was no implied federal right of action under the National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA) and that the plaintiffs therefore could not state a valid federal claim, the Eighth Circuit held not that violations of the NFIA would constitute negligence under Minnesota law, but rather that Minnesota could voluntarily incorporate the federal standards as the duty of care in a state cause of action. The court of appeals then remanded the case to state court for a determination of whether Minnesota would in fact incorporate the federal standards in a state law negligence action. Id.
[A] state court "is certainly free to look to the provisions of a federal statute for guidance in applying its longstanding common-law remedies" unless Congress has prohibited the state from looking to the statute's provisions as a standard in determining whether there has been a common-law breach of duty. 3 3
After careful consideration of relevant preemption factors and federalism concerns, 4 Hofbauer and other cases resting upon similar analyses 38 represent the better view. Rather than immediately invoking a presumption of preemption on the basis of an erroneous conception of federalism, 3 7 these cases consider carefully whether the denial of a federal right of action on the basis of the limited remedial powers of the federal judiciary should also foreclose the creation of traditional state remedies through state incorporation of federal law. . 1980) ). 34. The court's analysis considered such factors as the statute's purpose of providing protection against flood damage, the identity of the Hofbauers as members of the broad class of "flood victims" the statute was intended to protect, and the possibility of conflict with the federal scheme. 44 In Crane, the Court held that a state could make the defense of contributory negligence available to a railroad sued by a nonemployee for damages caused by the railroad's violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act.' 5 The nonemployee The whole foundation of the duty is Missouri law, which at its sole will incorporated the other law as it might incorporate a document. The other law or document depends for its relevance and effect not on its own force but upon the law that took it up, so I repeat once more the cause of action arises wholly from the law of the State. But see id. at 199-202 (majority opinion) (holding that presence of a pivotal question of federal law in state law cause of action was sufficient to sustain federal question jurisdiction). While the cases on federal jurisdiction in the context of incorporation by reference are "terribly confused," Currie, had no implied federal right of action 46 and therefore was relegated to a state law tort action. 47 The Court held that although a federal standard establishes the state duty of care, "the definition of causation and the availability of the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are left to state law."1 48 Moore and Crane thus establish that when states incorporate federal law the right to recover and the remedy are created and governed by state law, 4 and that, to the extent that they are not preempted by federal law, 50 the content and the very existence of such state rights of action are matters of federal indifference. 1 Since Moore, therefore, the states have been free to adopt federal standards, while creating rights of action and remedies that are wholly governed by state law.
A. The Legitimacy of State Incorporation of Federal Law
B. The Desirability of State Incorporation of Federal Law
State incorporation of federal law is an appropriate and effective device by which states can step into the breach created by the foreclosure of federal remedies 52 (1982) . Under Florida law, the determination of whether a certain submerged riverbed was sovereign land depended upon the navigability of the river at the time the land was acquired from the United States, a question of federal law. The court of appeals held that "there is no federal interest whatever in the resolution of this controversy. Federal law is appropriately indifferent to Florida's invocation or application of a federal test of navigability as a precondition to determining a question of state law." Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
52.
See Brennan, supra note 16, at 503. 53. It could be argued that the denial of an implied federal right of action not only forecloses a private remedy but also denies the existence of any private right under the federal statute. In several of the cases in which the Supreme Court has refused to find an implied right of action, however, the plaintiffs were members of the class that the statute was intended to protect. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (finding no implied right of action under § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940). Section 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982) , provides that it shall be unlawful for any investment adviser to engage in any act, practice, or course of business that operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client. Despite this federal right to be free of fraud, deception, and manipulation in investment advisement transactions, the Court held that defrauded private plaintiffs had no federal right of action for damages resulting from violations of § 206: "Section 206 of the Act here involved concededly was intended to protect the victims of the fraudulent practices it prohibited. But the mere fact that the statute was designed to protect advisers' clients does not require the implication of a private cause of action for damages on their behalf."
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., 444 U.S. at 24.
Even if the denial of an implied federal right of action were tantamount to the denial of the existence of a federal right of the plaintiff rather than merely the denial of a federal remedy, in the context of incorporation this distinction is immaterial, since the state, by incorporating the federal standard, creates a state cause of action wherein the plaintiff is vested with a private state right and the defendant is subjected to a state duty. statutory remedy, plaintiffs are traditionally relegated to whatever remedies they may have at state common law. 54 Existing state common law actions, however, may be inadequate to remedy the injury the plaintiff has suffered as a result of the violation of a federal statutory right. For example, the federally protected right may be one for which there is no analogous state common law action, or violation of the federal standard may be insufficient to constitute a violation of the state standard of care, or vindication of a federal right may be barred by state common law defenses, such as contributory negligence. By incorporating the federal standard into a state cause of action, a state may grant its citizens the same right as provided by the federal statute, while creating a private remedy for its breach. 5 Voluntary incorporation of federal standards can benefit states in several ways. One advantage of state incorporation of federal law is that it allows the creation of supplemental private remedies that serve the dual purposes of compensation and deterrence, 56 thereby reinforcing a comprehensive federal remedial scheme. When a plaintiff has suffered injury through another's violation of a statutory duty, state incorporation recognizes that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the "wrong done to him." '57 At the same time, a private remedy serves to enforce the statutory duty and vindicate the federal norm by deterring unlawful conduct. 58 Furthermore, the option of incorporating federal law enhances flexibility in the development of state regulatory and remedial schemes. A state is 54. See Pollard v. Bailey, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 520, 527 (1874) ("A general liability created by statute without a remedy may be enforced by an appropriate common-law action.").
55. Texas, for example, incorporated federal safety standards for mobile home construction into state law and provided a private right of action for consumers:
While the state's model of enforcement was designed with reference to the federal law, Texas has extended the implications of the federal law by providing redress for the individual.... The Texas legislature, rather than the United States Congress, has been sympathetic to enforcement of these federal duties for the benefit of the individual purchaser. Gatlin v. Countryside Indus., 564 F. Supp. at 1495. See also Greene, supra note 3, at 300-01 (states may attach additional consequences to violations of federally defined obligations); Mermin, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1-2 (states may supplement federal regulatory schemes by adopting and enforcing federal standards).
56. See Frankel, supra note 4, at 555-57 (discussing, in context of implication doctrine, deterrence and compensation justifications for private causes of action under federal securities statutes). , concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Although crimtnal laws and legislation enacted for the benefit of the public at large were expected to be enforced by public officials, a statute enacted for the benefit of a special class presumptively afforded a remedy for members of that class injured by violations of the statute.").
58. There may, of course, be a risk of overdeterrence through the creation of private actions. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97. For a critique of private remedies under the federal securities laws, see Frankel, supra note 4, at 570-78. Frankel argues that the provision of private actions under the broad and vague standards of the federal securities acts creates indeterminate, expansive liability which may deter useful market activity, and that the costs arising from this overdeterrence may outweigh the benefits of private enforcement. Id. at 578. under no compulsion to adopt a federal standard as the definition of the state duty of care or to extend a private right of action for its violation beyond the class of plaintiffs recognized by the federal law. 5 9 Yet if a state voluntarily incorporates the federal standard in a state cause of action, the state may create additional sanctions for breach of the federal law. 60 Moreover, state legislatures and courts are free to tailor the nature and scope of the remedy provided, as Crane illustrates. 61 State incorporation of federal law may also promote uniformity 62 between state and federal law, 6 " mitigating the risk of conflict between state 59. States will not always incorporate a federal standard as the state norm. A state that is indifferent or hostile to a federal standard may not wish to commit its resources to providing additional enforcement of such a standard. A state may be indifferent to the compensation of plaintiffs injured through violation of such a federal statute, and may indeed wish to insulate potential defendants from any additional liability under the federal standard. A state, for example, may have a strong interest in creating a regulation-free legal climate in order to attract new industry.
Aside from indifference or hostility toward federal standards, states may prefer to create their own unique standards in response to particularized state and local concerns. This comports well with the view that the states should function as social laboratories, each independently seeking the optimum solution to any given concern. As a practical matter, however, in areas in which there is an existing federal regulatory scheme, the possibility of federal preemption may constrain the states' ability to create diverse regulatory standards. See infra text accompanying notes 68-104. 60. A distinction should be made, however, between the creation of additional state sanctions for violations of a federal duty that already applies of its own force within the state, where the state's action merely enlarges the class of plaintiffs who may bring suit for violations of the standard, see Moore, 291 U.S. at 205, and the adoption of a federal standard to govern conduct not previously subject to federal governance, where the state's action extends the federal duty to a separate class of state defendants. In Moore, the defendant railway company was an interstate carrier and was therefore subject to a preexisting federal duty to abide by the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts. The Kentucky statute merely enlarged the class of plaintiffs eligible to bring suit for violation of the federal standards to include intrastate as well as interstate employees. In such a case, the existence of a concurrent federal regulatory scheme constrains the state's use of the federal standard. This is the issue addressed in this Note, for the denial of an implied private right of action almost presupposes the existence of a rather comprehensive federal remedial scheme. Any attempt by a state to incorporate or employ a federal standard in a manner inconsistent with the federal regulatory scheme is likely to run afoul of the preemption doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 68-104.
If, on the other hand, the defendant in Moore had been a municipal or intrastate trolley car railway rather than an interstate carrier, and therefore not subject to a preexisting federal duty, the state's action would have extended the federally defined duty to a new class of defendants, intrastate trolley lines. See generally Note, supra note 3, at 1503-04 (discussing this distinction in context of availability of Supreme Court review of hybrid state law). When the federal standard does not apply of its own force to the conduct that gives rise to the suit, the state is free to employ the standard in the development of the state regulatory or remedial scheme in any manner it deems fit.
61. In Crane, although the State of Iowa had adopted a federal standard of care, the Supreme Court held that the state was free to provide a defense of contributory negligence in suits under Iowa law even though the defense had been abrogated in suits under federal law. See Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry., 395 U.S. at 164.
62. Uniformity as used here is a relative term. State incorporation of federal law would not create greater uniformity of law than would exist if private plaintiffs had no remedy for violations of their federal statutory rights, but it does promote greater uniformity of law than would exist if each of the 50 states were to create a distinct cause of action.
63. The uniformity of law sought to be achieved by state incorporation of federal law is attainable, however, only to the extent that the federal standard is clear and unambiguous, either as written or as authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court. To attain uniformity between state and federal law and between the laws of the several states, all states adopting a given federal regulation must adhere to the federal interpretation of that regulation. See Note, supra note 3, at 1502.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1144, 1985 and federal regulatory enforcement schemes and thereby allowing states to create substantive regulatory programs in areas in which state action might otherwise be wholly preempted. 64 Further, the creation of parallel state standards provides an element of predictability and precedent to those who must obey the law, for the state may not impose a duty more burdensome than the identical and pre-existing federal duty. 6 5 Moreover, if a number of states were to adopt a given federal substantive standard as their own, this incorporation of federal law might also promote uniformity of law among the states themselves, thereby avoiding commerce-clause conflicts between coequal state laws. 66 Finally, state incorporation of federal law arguably combines the best features of state and federal regulatory systems. Although federal courts have only limited powers to fashion judicial remedies for statutory wrongs, state legislatures and common law courts of general jurisdiction are free to create new remedies for violations of any given standard of conduct, and to tailor these remedies to suit the state's purposes. Thus, when fashioning remedies state courts and legislatures can exercise a measure of creativity that is unavailable in enforcement through the federal courts. At the same time, however, by adopting federal law a state may take advantage of the sophistication and expertise embodied in the federal One means of ensuring uniformity is Supreme Court review of state court interpretations of federal law incorporated by reference. The availability of Supreme Court review, however, is the subject of considerable judicial and scholarly dispute. An argument can be made denying entirely the availability of Supreme Court review in hybrid state law cases. This view posits that the right of action is created by the state, the remedy is created by the state, and the incorporated federal standards are purely definitional. There is, therefore, no federal question and thus no basis for Supreme Court review. State law, purportedly regulating only state concerns, wholly subsumes the federal standards. See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Professor Tribe expresses a more moderate view: "[Tihe Supreme Court, in deciding whether it has jurisdiction to review state court interpretations of hybrid state law, must perform what is essentially a supremacy clause analysis: the Court must decide whether state autonomy threatens federal interests to such an extent that uniformity must prevail." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-33, at 122 (1978) (footnote omitted). Other commentators argue persuasively that Supreme Court review is justified to the extent that the incorporated federal law is operative of its own force. See Greene, supra note 3, at 304-05, 325-26; Note, supra note 3, at 1503-04. Finally, in some instances, such as where the possibility of preemption arises, the very existence of the hybrid state law may present a federal question sufficient to sustain Supreme Court review. See Greene, supra note 3, at 300.
64. "[B]y preventing the state from interpreting [a federal act] so as to impose duties at variance with those which the federal courts find to have been required by the federal act, a possible invalidation of the state law on the grounds that federal law 'filled the field' is avoided." Note, supra note 3, at 1502 (footnote omitted).
65. See id. at 1501. 66. The Supreme Court has considered the effect of other states' law in assessing commerceclause claims. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (invalidating as imposing undue burden on interstate commerce a state's regulation barring all trucks longer than 55 feet from its highways, when 33 other states permitted the use of standard-sized 65 foot double trailers); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (invalidating as imposing undue burden on interstate commerce a state statute requiring use of contour mudguards on trucks and trailers operating within state when use of conventional mudfilaps was permissible in at least 45 other states). standard, 6 " and thereby achieve and maintain conformity with the federal standard in furtherance of a single nationwide duty. In short, state incorporation of federal law represents the best of both worlds.
III. LIMITS TO THE CREATION OF STATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
The primary challenge to state incorporation of federal law is the possibility of federal preemption. 8 Under the supremacy clause, a state may not act in contravention of the express will of Congress. If the creation of private remedies through state incorporation of federal law would thwart the express intent of Congress or severely impair the operation of a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme, such state action would be barred under the doctrine of federal preemption. Federal law, and particularly a comprehensive remedial scheme, might be deemed to have "filled the field," leaving no room for state action of any kind. 69 In other instances, a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme may partially preclude state action, or may circumscribe the nature and scope of permissible state regulatory activity. Alternatively, a court may find that a newly created state right of action directly conflicts with the federal enforcement scheme.
If Congress intends to preempt the creation of state remedies, it must do so "expressly or by fair implication.1 7 0 In the federal system, there is an assumption of concurrent jurisdiction between the states and the federal government. 1 Thus, unless Congress makes an unambiguous statement of 67. The federal standard may have been established after a full congressional weighing of the interests at stake on the basis of nationwide evidence. Moreover, the standard may have been further refined and perfected through precedents established by the federal regulatory agency in the course of its practical enforcement efforts. Finally, a federal standard is specially designed to be applied effectively throughout the country.
68. The preemption issue arises under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. A state law that is incompatible with a federal statute must yield to, and is thus "preempted" by, the federal legislation. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975) (recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that state legislation will be allowed to stand where Congress has not expressed a clear intent to preempt, or where conflict is neither directly related to the purpose of the federal statute nor immediately apparent).
Another challenge to incorporation is the prohibition contained in several state constitutions against delegation of state legislative power to other lawmaking bodies, especially through the adoption of federal law infuturo as well as that currently existing. While this presents a formidable obstacle to the incorporation of federal law, states have generally succeeded in circumventing such prohibitions. A state, for example, may adopt only existing federal law, with the proviso that the state shall be guided, but not bound, by future federal interpretations of the incorporated federal legislation. See generally Mermin, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 4-26 (concluding that because of recognized doctrinal exceptions, such state constitutional prohibitions ordinarily will not bar adoption of federal law). The Supreme Court's recent opinions denying implied rights of action under federal statutes present no bar to the creation of state rights of action. 74 The Supreme Court has not held that private rights of action would be inappropriate or in conflict with existing enforcement mechanisms, but rather that such remedies were not expressly authorized by Congress. 7 5 In other words, the Court has not put forward positive arguments against private rights of action, but has in most cases merely accepted the negative implication that because Congress failed to authorize such a right of action, Congress must not have intended to create one. 7 8 While the Court has held that other remedies authorized by a particular Alexander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST even before the ratification of the Constitution:
When ... we consider the state governments and the national governments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the state courts would have concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the union, where it was not expressly prohibited. 75. The argument that implied private rights of action would conflict with particular federal regulatory schemes has generally been advanced by academic commentators rather than by the courts. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 570-85.
76. But see exceptions noted supra note 74.
federal statute provided adequate relief, it has done so without suggesting that a private right of action would result in overenforcement or be otherwise inimical to federal goals. 7 Therefore, to the extent that the Supreme Court puts forward no positive arguments against a private right of action, state rights of action should not be voided as in conflict with and thus preempted by federal law. Nonetheless, a state may not act in a manner that creates an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 7 8 Therefore, even in the absence of a clear statement prohibiting states from creating private remedies where an implied federal right of action has been denied, courts and legislatures must still consider whether the nature of the particular federal regulatory scheme precludes further state action. 7 9
The sole question is whether Congress has impliedly prohibited states from incorporating the federal law as the state duty of care and from creating additional remedies for its breach. 0 The analysis must begin with a consideration of the language and history of the regulatory statute. If Congress has made an explicit statement that permits, limits, or prohibits state action, the role of the states in the creation of supplementary remedies is generally quite clear." 1 There may be, for example, a statutory bar to state action, as when Congress explicitly declares a given federal remedial scheme to be a plaintiff's sole and exclusive remedy, 2 or when a statute clearly provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction." Likewise, the exis- For a discussion of the creation of private remedies in relation to comprehensive regulatory schemes in the context of the implication doctrine, see Comment tence of a "savings clause" preserving the jurisdiction of state courts is strong evidence of intent to permit state action. 84 As in the implied federal rights of action context, however, difficulties arise when the statute is silent as to the provision of private remedies. 85 Courts must then consider several other factors. First, the provision of a private state remedy must be consistent with the purpose of the federal statute, broadly construed. 8 6 The creation or continuance of a state right of action should be allowed as long as the resultant remedy is consistent with and promotes the attainment of the federal goals. 87 86. State courts of general jurisdiction are traditionally vested with the common law power to fashion rights and remedies. Therefore, in determining the appropriateness of the provision of a remedy by a state court, rather than by a federal court of limited jurisdiction, a statute should be construed broadly rather than narrowly.
87. See Hofbauer v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 700 F.2d 1197, 1201 (8th Cir. 1983) ("We do not see how these [federal] goals would be frustrated by allowing common-law negligence suits ... " Iconco v. Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d at 1298.
88. See supra note 53; infra note 90. 89. Federal courts sitting in diversity may also be free to construe the definition of the class to be protected more broadly in interpreting state law. See infra note 90.
90. See Hofbauer v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 700 F.2d at 1200. In Hojbauer, the court held that the plaintiffs had no implied right of action under the National Flood Insurance Act:
The Hofbauers are members of a class for whose benefit the statute was enacted. But in order to satisfy the first of the Cort v. Ash criteria they must show more. They must be members of a "special class" for whose benefit the statute was enacted . . . and show that Congress drafted the statute with an "unmistakable focus on the benefitted class." ... This they cannot do. Id. (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979)) (citations omitted).
In remanding the case to state court, however, the Eighth Circuit indicated that if Minnesota common law adopted the requirements of the federal Act as the applicable standard of conduct, the plaintiffs might be able to state a valid claim for common law negligence: "The purpose of the statute is to aid flood victims and lessen federal expenses for flood relief. We do not see how these goals would be frustrated by allowing common-law negligence suits . . . ." Id. at 1201 (emphasis added). See also Iconco v. Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d at 1298-99 (although Small Business Act provided no authorization for civil suits of any kind, the court indicated that plaintiff could base common law action for fraud and unjust enrichment by unsuccessful bidder against successful one on violation of federal standard). state right of action would conflict with the federal regulatory scheme. 9 2 In contrast to the creation of new and possibly conflicting state duties, the creation of identical parallel standards and the provision of merely supplemental state remedies minimizes the risk of federal preemption. 93 Nonetheless, a state right of action could create conflict by distorting the impact and incentives of an intricate and finely balanced comprehensive federal enforcement scheme. 94 The problem is essentially one of overdeterrence.
9 5
The cumulation of civil, administrative, and possibly criminal sanctions may overburden a regulated industry." 6 Creation of a private right of action for damages may disturb the level of enforcement sought to be maintained by the federal regulatory agency, 97 and the prospect of potential civil liability may deter even lawful conduct on the part of regulated defendants. Furthermore, tensions may arise between private and agency enforcement. 9 First, private enforcement could pose a threat to the uniformity of interpretation and application of the federal standard promulgated by the agency. Second, a private remedy may produce results at odds with the aims and policy objectives of the the regulatory statute, as interpreted by the agency. Third, a private remedy may vitiate plaintiffs' incentives to exhaust their administrative remedies, thereby encroaching upon the agency's regulatory authority. Finally, a private remedy may have long-run economic effects both within and between regulated industries, resulting in an allocation of resources away from excessively regulated or overburdened activities or industries toward less regulated sectors." 9 As a result of these tensions, the provision of a private remedy might create a situation where the agency "can no longer speak with authority in its own house." '° Some of these tensions could be resolved by referring appropriate cases to the agency for an initial adjudication. 01 Inevitably, however, some tensions would remain. An evaluation of the practical effect of a private remedy on a federal regulatory scheme as a whole may require a balancing of the equity of providing compensation to injured individuals against the value to the industry and the public of a purely public enforcement scheme. 10 2 If the private remedy would create no conflict, or if the equities of providing compensation to injured individuals outweigh potential minor distortions of the federal regulatory scheme, 0 3 a private remedy should be allowed. 104 
CONCLUSION
Unlike their federal counterparts, state common law courts are vested with broad and expansive powers to create rights and remedies. For a state court to assume that its own remedial powers are no broader than those of the federal courts' 0 5 reflects a fundamental misconception of the federalism concerns at issue in this area. State rights of action are created not by federal courts of limited jurisdiction, but by common law courts of general jurisdiction. The state courts' power to create rights of action and remedies is limited only by the possibility of federal preemption. Preemption aside, where the federal courts have denied a litigant a remedy for a federal right, it is not only permissible, but proper for state courts of general jurisdiction to step into the breach created by the foreclosure of federal remedies. In view of the apparent demise of the implied right of action under the Burger Court, state incorporation of federal law is an appropriate step forward in the vindication of private individuals' state and federal statutory rights.
-Pauline E. Calande
